Army shares analysis used in eliminating 3rd Brigade
Earlier this month, U.S. Rep. Sanford Bishop invited a three-star Army general to Columbus to address a group of about 100 political, business and civic leaders.
It was a blunt presentation.
Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson’s topic was a military value analysis that led to Fort Benning’s loss of the 3rd Infantry Brigade last year. It contained hard numbers based on the ability to house an armor brigade combat team.
On the surface, the findings are alarming, but others have found in them the possible opportunity to attract new units to Fort Benning as the Army continues to draw down and realign.
The Army evaluated 14 posts last June for the ability to house a heavy armored combat brigade, and Benning was placed in the bottom third, lumped with Fort Carson, Colo.; Fort Richards, Alaska; and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
The top five posts were Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Drum, N.Y.; Fort Hood, Texas; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.; and Fort Wainwright, Alaska. The middle third was Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort Campbell, Ky.; Fort Polk, La.; Fort Riley, Kan.; and Fort Stewart, Ga. The installations were not ranked individually, only in groups.
“It is alarming, and that is why we wanted to bring Gen. Anderson down to talk about it,” Bishop said on Friday. “We wanted to make sure the community understands the situation so that they can make what corrections that need to be made.”
Brian Anderson, president of Greater Columbus Chamber of Commerce, framed the cuts in terms of the 2011 congressional Budget Control Act, commonly called sequestration.
“We’re in a different day,” Brian Anderson said. “ ... This whole conversation is budget-related. It’s not defense department strategy generated. It’s not based on world affairs. It’s simply a budget equation that there is this much money, what level of military — Army, Navy, Air Force — can you deliver?”
Fort Benning is the largest economic engine in the Chattahoochee Valley with roughly 27,500 active duty soldiers, 6,600 support and reserve soldiers and about 4,200 civilian employees.
Former Fort Benning commander Maj. Gen. Scott Miller, during an interview last week, cautioned that this should not be read as the Army’s devaluation of Fort Benning.
“You look at what the Army leadership says when they look at Fort Benning — it’s not me saying this, I have heard senior leaders say it — it’s not only the heart and soul of the maneuver force as you would expect with the Maneuver Center of Excellence, but the heart and soul of the Army,” Miller said.
In the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process, local officials were pushing for an additional heavy armored combat brigade to join 3rd Brigade at Fort Benning. What the post landed, instead, was the Armor School, which was previously at Fort Knox, Ky. That led the Army to form the Maneuver Center of Excellence, combining infantry and armor into one training site and environment. The Army has invested more than $3 billion in capital improvements to Fort Benning since that 2005 decision.
The Armor School and Infantry School are part of the emphasis on training at Fort Bennning. The Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade and the bulk of the Army’s basic training for enlisted soldiers is conducted at Fort Benning. That makes Fort Benning reliant on training units, though the 75th Ranger Regiment is assigned to Fort Benning.
Bishop recently instructed his staff to discuss the Army’s findings with the Ledger-Enquirer, which was not present at the March 8 meeting where Lt. Gen. Anderson spoke. The analysis, which was strictly based on the needs of an armored brigade combat team, found four primary deficiencies at Fort Benning, according to information obtained through Bishop’s office:
▪ Lack of training maneuver land. At the time of the analysis, Fort Benning did not have sufficient training land for an armored brigade combat team. The analysis noted that there was sufficient land for its current units and training mission, and Fort Benning has sufficient land for a variety of other smaller combat units, should there be a force structure increase at Fort Benning.
▪ Lack of airspace. Fort Benning has a smaller restricted airspace largely because of Atlanta’s Jackson-Hartsfield International Airport to the north. Some posts have 500 miles or more of unrestricted airspace, compared to slightly more than 200 miles for Fort Benning.
▪ Dudded impact area. At the time of the analysis, Benning was unable to use all of the impact area it maintained due to previous use of the weapon system that contained unstable materials. As a result, Fort Benning could use only 9,385 of its available 16,068 acres of impact area for firing high-explosive ordnance. The post will obtain a license by the end of this month permitting the use of all 16,068 acres for firing high-explosive ordnance. If another analysis was conducted near the time of obtaining this license, this would no longer be a concern.
▪ The brigade’s geographic distribution. The distance between the 3rd Brigade Combat Team based at Fort Benning and the 3rd Infantry Division at Benning headquartered at Fort Stewart near Savannah did not permit for adequate mission command for the purposes of training, logistics,and personnel management.
Fort Benning scored well on other criteria such as soldier well-being, which takes into account access to medical care, quality of life facilities, family housing and unit infrastructure. It also scored well on expansibility, which includes developable area, population, community impact, and connectivity.
Those positives give hope to Gary Jones, executive vice president of military affairs for the Greater Columbus Chamber of Commerce, which hosted the meeting.
“You have to know where you are to know where you are going to go,” Jones said.
And where those fighting to protect and increase troop strength are going is to units that don’t need as much training land, Jones said.
“A Stryker brigade or an infantry brigade requires much less maneuver training area than an armored brigade combat team,” Jones said. “Once the armored combat team issue went away, they are indicating that there is adequate land for them to make sure they train to standard.”
Miller pointed out that other opportunities may be available in the case of a quick buildup. He noted the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment Task Force that was established at Fort Benning late last year. That unit is made up of about 1,000 selected soldiers from the six inactivated battalions.
“When you look at force structure across the Army, one of the things the chief (of staff) looks at is the ability to expand rapidly, if needed,” Miller said. “You still have Army Task Force 1-28 here, which means you bring a lot of leaders, tactical ability and leader development. You have infrastructure here. Fort Benning is not in trouble. It remains important to the Army and it remains important to the nation.”
Jones said that Benning is in the mix for a new unit now, but would not elaborate.
“When you say how is Benning being perceived, Benning is being perceived as the potential recipient of a future unit already,” Jones said. “Enough said.”
There is definitely opportunity, Bishop said.
“There is plenty of land, adequate training space,” Bishop said. “One of the things we got gigged on was there was not adequate training space. We don’t need that much now.”
But that doesn’t change the budget climate.
“What you are seeing is some stress on the budget that has resulted in some force structure cuts,” Miller said. “And you have to make some tough, tough decisions. It wasn’t a decision anybody wanted to make. It’s a decision based on a Budget Control Act.”
What happened at Fort Benning was part of a broader Army-wide effort to reduce troop numbers and cut costs. The Army has moved to downsize from 570,000 troops to 450,000 in two phases. Fort Benning gained 400 troops in the initial cuts of about 80,000 Army-wide, but it was tagged to lose 3,402 positions in the second round, with the 3rd Brigade Armored Combat Team told in the summer of 2015 that it was being deactivated.
Brig. Gen. Eric J. Wesley, the new commander of the Manuever Center of Excellence and Fort Benning, said Friday that the local leadership should continue to focus on troop reduction at Fort Benning.
“I would argue that all the community leaders need to keep this in mind: this is not an Army decision that is based on a independent desire to remove 3rd Brigade,” Wesley said. “But all of this goes back to certain constraints we are under — the BCA, sequester as it’s known. That is really the source of the issue. As long as we have the budget restraints we do as a result of that legislation, it will be incumbent on the Army to make these kinds of decisions.”
Wesley said you can agree or disagree with the Army’s decision to take the 3rd Brigade from Fort Benning, but that’s a decision that has been made.”
“We have got to move forward,” he said. “The best way to get after this is to consider the impact of the BCA and not ultimately the decision the Army made.”
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Chuck Williams: 706-571-8510, @chuckwilliams
This story was originally published March 19, 2016 at 9:58 PM with the headline "Army shares analysis used in eliminating 3rd Brigade."