Federal judge issues ruling in City of Columbus dispute over railyard property
A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit in which the Columbus Consolidated Government sought to reclaim railyard property from Norfolk Southern and other railroad companies, ruling that the city’s state-law claims are blocked by federal law and must be pursued, if at all, through federal channels.
U.S. District Judge Clay Land, in a March 25 order, denied CCG’s request to send the case back to Muscogee County Superior Court and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Land ruled that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, known as the ICCTA, “completely preempts” the city’s state claims because the relief CCG seeks would interfere with rail transportation, an area Congress placed under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The result, Land acknowledged, can feel counterintuitive: the judge said the case belongs in federal jurisdiction, but he still dismissed it because CCG did not assert a federal claim in the complaint removed from a state court.
What the City of Columbus and the railroads argued
According to the complaint, railroad companies asked the City of Columbus in the 1800s for land to build railroad facilities. The city passed resolutions conveying parcel, which the order refers to collectively as the “Railyard Lots” — comprising approximately 90 acres — under terms that varied but included reversion clauses.
Those clauses generally said ownership would revert to the city if certain things happened, including if the railroads stopped using the land for passenger depots, crossed the Chattahoochee River or charged to store goods on the property.
By the 1970s, when passenger train services ceased in Columbus and the railroads sold or demolished their depots, this triggered the terms that should return the land and title to CCG, the city argued.
CCG alleged that at an unspecified time the railroads crossed the river, began charging for storage and stopped operating passenger depots, and that the Railyard Lots therefore reverted to the city.
Columbus also alleged the defendants now use the property for “temporary parking of empty train cars, temporary storage of train cars containing goods, and passage of through traffic which neither originates or terminates in Columbus,” and that each defendant is in unlawful possession and/or control of the property.
Based on those allegations, Columbus brought state-law claims for continuing trespass, injunction, ejectment and nuisance, seeking to reclaim the property.
The defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing federal-question jurisdiction existed because the ICCTA completely preempted the city’s state-law claims. They maintained CCG’s “exclusive remedy” to eject rail carriers from the property was to pursue an “adverse abandonment” petition with the federal Surface Transportation Board.
CCG contends the ICCTA didn’t preempt its claims, the federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and the case should be remanded to a state court.
Represented by Columbus law firm Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, CCG filed its complaint Aug. 28 in the Superior Court of Muscogee County against:
- Norfolk Southern Corp.
- Norfolk Southern Railway Company
- Central of Georgia Railway Company
- The South-Western Rail Road Company
- Genesee & Wyoming Railroad Services
- Columbus & Chattahoochee Railroad
- Georgia Southwestern Railroad.
Judge’s rationale for his decision
Land noted CCG didn’t dispute that the defendants are “rail carrier[s]” and that they use the Railyard Lots for “rail transportation” as defined by federal law. The question, he wrote, was whether CCG sought state remedies that regulate rail transportation and whether the ICCTA provides an exclusive federal remedy that covers the city’s bid to remove the railroads.
The judge concluded that ejectment-style claims — including trespass and nuisance claims that would remove railroad facilities — amount to regulation because success would “cause a cessation of rail transportation,” which he called “the ultimate regulation of rail transportation.”
CCG argued its case was essentially about enforcing voluntary agreements embodied in city resolutions, not regulating transportation, and cited decisions including PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk Southern in 2009. Land found that reliance unpersuasive in this context.
Land also concluded the ICCTA provides a substitute federal remedy: an adverse abandonment claim under federal law and regulations, which may be brought before the Surface Transportation Board by a property owner seeking to eject a rail carrier.
Seeking reaction to Land’s decision, the Ledger-Enquirer didn’t reach Columbus Mayor Skip Henderson, City Attorney Clifton Fay or Jack Schley of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford before publication. Norfolk Southern senior communications manager Heather Garcia declined to comment.
What happens next
Because CCG’s’ complaint didn’t plead a federal adverse abandonment claim and didn’t clearly allege other non-preempted claims, Land dismissed the case “without prejudice,” meaning CCG still may pursue an adverse abandonment claim before the Surface Transportation Board or a non-preempted state-law claim.
The judge also observed that if the Surface Transportation Board concludes the defendants haven’t abandoned the property and shouldn’t be ejected, CCG “may pursue a remedy for compensation under the Takings Clause” of the U.S. Constitution.
CCG wants the railyard moved to make more than 30 acres available for development, officials told the Ledger-Enquirer in 2023.
This story was originally published March 26, 2026 at 1:08 PM.
